

Liberty

NOT THE DAUGHTER BUT THE MOTHER OF ORDER. PROUDHON

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Whole No. 389.

"For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light whereby the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee."
JOHN HAY.

On Picket Duty.

Evidently no opportunity is being neglected by the Japanese for demoralizing the Russian government. When the Russian prisoners in Japan get back to their native land, they will not be the same men that they were when they left. They are taking a course in political education, and they are not likely to be so tame and tractable any longer. The Japanese have been keeping them plentifully supplied with revolutionary literature which the propagandists in England and America have cheerfully furnished, and it is possible that the seed thus sown will be no small factor in the inevitable overthrow of the Russian autocracy. This episode is also a reminder that there are some people of other nationalities who might profit through being Japanese prisoners of war.

Illinois has a drastic anti-boycott law, but this law has not prevented thousands of teamsters and other unionized workmen from declaring, publicly urging, and openly carrying on a boycott against the powerful department-store interests of Chicago. "Enforce the law," the plutocratic newspapers, lawyers, and employers have shrieked; "arrest, try, and convict the officers of the boycotting unions; hold them responsible for the violence, the 'slugging,' and the rioting the boycott has provoked." But somehow the hue and cry has failed of effect. Even the injunctions obtained have been "barren idealities." You cannot punish men for boycotting—not while trial by jury survives and public sympathy favors the boycotters. Experience is teaching labor the beauty and virtue of passive resistance.

To the many occidental institutions which the Chinese have found it expedient to adopt has lately been added the boycott, and the use which they are making and promise to make of it bids fair to eclipse any application of it that has been made over here. The exclusion of the Chinaman from the United States has long rankled in his heart, and he has probably thought of it often when using American products in his own country. It is strange, however, that it has not sooner occurred to him what a powerful weapon against our unjust discrimination he holds in his hands; but he has discovered it at last, and already sales of American products in China are falling off, Americans in China are being severely let alone, and even the coolie longshoremen refuse to unload American ships. Unlike the American trade-unionist, the Chinaman

believes in adhering strictly to contracts, so his boycott does not apply to contracts previously entered into, and these will be fulfilled to the letter; but, when a Chinaman goes in for anything, he goes in for it thoroughly, and, unless the rigors of the exclusion laws are soon modified, we may expect an epoch-making demonstration of the value of the boycott. It is amusing to see the frenzy of American politicians, who are being urged by Pacific coast merchants to revoke the law, while organized labor everywhere admonishes them to "stand pat." The result is that our consular agents in China are being instructed to secure a removal of the boycott, but these agents are met with the bland smile of the Mongolian, who tells them simply that nobody is doing anything, nobody is committing a crime or misdemeanor, how, therefore, can officials act? And so frenzy is fast merging into despair, for no relief is in sight. May we not now expect Mr. E. C. Walker to come forward with a demand for protection for the American exporter, who is being "invaded" by the fact that the Chinese can do without his wares?

Moses Harman, whose arrest was announced in the May number of Liberty, has been convicted, in the United States district court at Chicago, on the charge of sending obscene literature through the mails and has been sentenced to one year in prison. He was released on bail, however, and is now at liberty pending an appeal to the United States circuit court. As previously stated, the articles (in "Lucifer") upon which the conviction was based are unavailable by only the most rigid construction of the Comstock postal law,—a law of which Liberty's opinion is well known. The trial was, moreover, marked by a characteristic which is a striking example of the methods pursued by the federal judiciary in cases where ethical opinions opposed to those held by the presiding magistrates are involved. The accused was not permitted to address the jury in his own behalf, and, after the jury, upon the instruction of the judge, had returned a verdict of guilty, the convicted man was refused the privilege—commonly accorded to the vilest criminals—of giving his reasons why sentence should not be pronounced upon him. Following the conviction, the next number of "Lucifer" was deposited for mailing in the post-office at Chicago, was promptly confiscated, and was sent to the dead letter office at Washington, where the entire edition was destroyed by order of the post-office department, without even a notification of the fact being sent to the publisher. This application of the "administrative process"—patterned after those of the European

autocracies—was duly and formally protested against by a special representative of the Free Speech League, who was sent to bring the case before the assistant attorney-general for the post-office department, and this official promptly made the sweeping decision that the articles complained of (a couple of very mild disquisitions on the sex question) were obscene and should be excluded from the mails, giving incidentally his unofficial opinion that *all* literature on that subject should be denied transmission through the mails. Here are bigotry and intolerance run riot; but it has cleared the air, and we now have a real Russian censorship in full running order at the Chicago post-office, where the superintendent of second-class mails passes on "Lucifer's" contents before the paper is mailed, deciding whether the matter isailable or not. This certainly relieves the publisher of the risk of unwittingly violating the law, and to that extent it is an improvement upon the old system. But let us hear no more about the existence of a free press in America! Obviously money is needed to carry the case to a higher court, and all those wishing to contribute for that purpose may send remittances to the treasurer of the Free Speech League, Dr. E. B. Foote, Jr., 120 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

The Mountain Republic.

This is my country, these brave heights,
And that green fir bough is my flag
In whose bright gleam mine eye delights.
How wild it waves above the crag!

Here is a rude republic, ruled
By no gold god or Prince of Hire,
In sodden Trade's mean wisdom schooled,
But only by the Heart's Desire.

No mastered men, or desk-doomed, haunt
These free-aired wilds to slave and sigh;
Here straight Convention makes no vaunt
And liberty is not a lie.

No constitution of men's choice,
But one that willing Nature signs,
Framed by the wind that lifts its voice
In yonder parliament of pines.

My church, how broad, how grandly broad!
The alpenglow her altar fire,
Her organings the winds of God,
And that white peak her splendid spire.

Over my airy skyland home
The Vision floats within the reach,
And star-born thoughts are free to come—
Thoughts never to be meshed in speech.

Come, hearts that sicken, here is health,
Here shall the wearing, wasting cease;
Come to this cloud-blest commonwealth;
The peaks invite you to their peace.

Bailey Millard.

Liberty.

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"In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution abolishes at one stroke the sword of the executioner, the seal of the magistrate, the club of the policeman, the gauge of the exciseman, the erasing-knife of the department clerk, all those insignia of Politics, which young Liberty grinds beneath her heel."—
PROUDHON.

The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that he disapproves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

The Life of Josiah Warren.

The advance subscriptions to William Bailie's book on "Josiah Warren, the First American Anarchist," have continued to come in, since the last number of Liberty appeared, but the total number is still somewhat short of what Mr. Bailie deems to be necessary to warrant him in sending the volume to the press. The readers of Liberty are so familiar with Mr. Bailie's contributions to its columns that they do not need the assurance that the book will be worthy of its subject and worth the price (\$1.00) charged for it.

The Supreme Court as the Guardian of Liberty.

It is hardly necessary to premise a discussion of the recent decision of the United States supreme court in the bakers' case by disclaiming sympathy with so-called "labor legislation," which is generally, if not invariably, paternalistic in intent and plutocratic in effect—which, in other words, is a delusion and a snare. To readers of Liberty this is a familiar position.

But to maintain that the only solution of the labor problem is the abolition of State-protected and State-fostered monopoly is not to say that we libertarians are bound to hail with enthusiasm any and every court decision annulling a labor statute on pseudo-individualistic grounds. Plutocratic individualism is of a piece with "standpattist reciprocity"—all take and no give. The courts, with few exceptions, find no violation of individual liberty except where labor or the public at large hopes to benefit by the restriction.

The organized bakers of New York, lacking initiative, strength, or energy, obtained some years ago a statute limiting work in bakeries and confectionery establishments to ten hours a day and sixty hours a week. The act prohibited employees and journeymen to contract for extra work. It was, strictly speaking, an invasive act, for, if a man chooses to work twelve hours, no one should have the power to restrain him.

But the courts of New York sustained the law as a proper and reasonable exercise of the "police power" of the State. They held it to be "a health measure," a restriction justified by

due regard for public safety, hygiene, and morals. Since scores of laws plainly invasive are annually sustained under the police power, this view of the ten-hour bakers' act was in no wise unnatural and extraordinary.

But the United States supreme court has reversed the State judiciary and killed the act. It said of it:

It necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employees concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer. The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. Under that provision no State can deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are circumstances which exclude the right.

As to the health plea, the opinion said:

It is a question which of two powers or rights shall prevail—the power of the State to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract. The mere assertion that the subject relates to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct relation as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor. We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this case.

An eight-hour law for the miners and smelter workmen of Utah was upheld a few years ago, though it was just as restrictive and stringent as the bakeries act. The supreme court, therefore, claims the right to decide in any given case whether or not "the subject relates to the public health."

Lysander Spooner contended in his argument for the restoration of the original and genuine system of trial by jury that the real legislator is he who construes and "declares" the law. The pretensions of our courts have nullified the constitutional separation of governmental powers. The law is what the courts choose to make it.

What does the supreme court know about work in bakeries? What qualifications has it for deciding whether public health does or does not require limitation of bakers' hours of labor? The legislature is supposed to represent the public. Its members are drawn from all classes and ranks. Moreover, it grants hearings in cases of any importance; it conducts investigations and considers practical as well as theoretical objections to proposed measures. It is far more competent to pass upon questions of fact than judges. Yet the supreme court undertakes to say that miners do, and bakers do not, need the protection of the State in regard to their hours of work.

Plutocracy undoubtedly prefers legislation and government by judges, and especially by irresponsible judges who are appointed for life and have no political campaigns before them to suggest consideration of popular feelings and prejudices. But for this very reason no intelligent libertarian will take them seriously in the rôle of guardians of individual rights.

So far as the New York bakers are concerned, they have learned that organization, strikes or the threat of strikes, boycotts or the threat of boycotts are more effective than legislative pro-

hibitions and interferences. A valuable lesson, this; after a series of such eye-opening illustrations labor will perceive the futility of paternalistic legislation and the need of self-help and voluntary coöperation for legitimate purposes.

S. R.

The Simple Life and the Strenuous Life.

(Concluded.)

But I see I am beginning to assume that a certain amount of refraining from strenuousness is desirable; and, strenuousness being notoriously the delight of the American people, I cannot expect that all will let me assume this. We have been told, on Dr. Watts's authority, that Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do; and Watts took this from notorious experience. Furthermore, Gov. Vardaman of Mississippi says that he never knew of a case where a hard-working negro had committed a crime of a nature to provoke a lynching. Is it not true that idleness breeds vice and crime? Furthermore—to apply the test which H. G. Wells says is the only valid test for judging any social policy whatever—what is its effect on the children? How often does one hear of an idler's children turning out creditably, however amiable the idler himself may have been?

These are weighty charges, and I fear it may be safest not to try to deny that an over-indulgence in idleness is a vice just like any other gluttony. Yet there is another side. Against Gov. Vardaman we may set Josiah Flynt, who testifies that the crimes committed by tramps are not committed by the true "hoboes" who refuse to do any work, but by the "gay-cats" who are on the tramp looking for work or at least willing to accept it if it comes their way. Against Dr. Watts we may set certain fine Bible texts about the moral peril of devoting one's self to strenuous pursuit of wealth and so on. It is not undisputed that Dusty Rhodes is either more vicious or more pernicious than Rockefeller. Over-strenuousness is at least another gluttony. It may be the legitimate resource of a man who foresees, like Caius Gracchus or Jesus Christ, that he will never be permitted to live out the span of life for which a common man must save his strength; but it has certainly been the ruin of many a good man's life. And, if you list the sons of the great strenuous men of history, how many of them are notably better than the sons of the admirable idlers of history?

The fact is—and it is pretty widely admitted, too—that over-strenuousness is a fault, and a very common fault, and a danger in our national life to-day; and that a certain amount of under-strenuousness on the part of some people furnishes a desirable balance, by giving us an example and a temptation to the normal share of rest which we are so unready to take, and by giving us the advantage of experienced companionship in the restful life when we do get ourselves into it for a fortnight or so. Besides, so long as we live on the un-Kropotkinian principle of the division of labor, certain elements of human life can best be furnished by letting some specialize in the direction of the contemplative life, for just the same reason as we specialize in other things. You can no more have Thoreau without admitting the swarm of village loafers than you can have Bismarck without ad-

mitting the swarm of ward politicians; and the world could better spare Bismarck than Thoreau.

But, to come back to the tyranny of public opinion,—we might yet put up with that if it would stop there. But now we have a recrudescence of an old political fault, associated with the recrudescence of race prejudice. Where two races come together, and the more strenuous one is (naturally) dominant, it proceeds first to despise the less strenuous, then to get angry at seeing these contemptible creatures enjoy the delights of loafing while their betters are toiling and moiling, then (as of course the other race's labor is cheap when he can get it) to get still more angry at seeing such a deal of such delightfully cheap labor going to waste and himself missing a whole lot of profits that he would have made if this cheap labor had been available to him; and at last he goes and enacts a law that the sheriff shall have authority to seize and put to work any man (understood in its application to be "any negro") who persistently idles without having a store of capital to support him while he does so (this is the recent enactment of one of our southern states), or else a law imposing on every Zulu hut a tax which is intended to be so heavy that the ordinary Zulu cannot possibly pay it unless he work hard (this is Natal just now; you remember the reason why the British cause was supposed to be the cause of a higher civilization was because the Boers oppressed the natives so).

It should be borne in mind that the trouble is not an impossibility of getting labor if you are willing to pay the price that will bring out that labor, as old-fashioned political economy bids you do. I am willing to risk the statement that any cotton-planter in the laziest county of Mississippi can have all the hands his fields can hold by offering three dollars a day. Doubtless half the sum would do it. Similarly, it cannot be doubted that the Natal sugar-planters, by raising the rate of wages, would bring out some of these black idlers, and, if they raised it high enough, would even attract European labor. But, though the laws of political economy are an admirable appeal when your employé tries some mean trick to make you pay him ten per cent more than he is getting, it is obvious that political economy cannot have any validity at all when it commands you to offer three shillings wages where you have been accustomed to paying two. No science on earth can be genuine if it leads to such conclusions as that. It is much simpler to tax the poor man so heavily that, if he spends part of his time on strike, or holds his labor waiting for a better market, or any of those things that political economy regards as so natural, he cannot escape having the roof pulled down over his head for failure to pay his taxes.

I never before happened to hear of a case where taxation was used with the intent of having it work in precisely this way. It strikes me as beautifully simple and efficient, besides the fact that you get the tax-money. But who are these Zulus who need such a tax to make them work? Doubtless an inefficient race who might be taxed to death and the earth lose nothing?

Let me inform you that within a hundred

years the Zulus, under their king Tyaka (Chaka, or eight other spellings), conquered all southeast Africa. Tyaka, like Philip of Macedon, had invented a new shape of spear to make possible a new form of military organization. Nothing but the white settlements, with which he never chose to quarrel, stopped his conquests. A runaway fragment of Tyaka's army formed the great inland Matabele state, till lately the most dreaded power on the inland side of the mountains. A defeated tribe, flying from Tyaka, bore down all opposition to its march all the way to the Victoria Nyanza, and then turned back and settled itself in what it saw fit of the lands it had crossed. This is their record in war; and in peace—and in our day—hear what Dr. Clark, the head of the Christian Endeavor Movement, says he saw on one of his recent round-the-world tours of inspection:

That cheap corrugated iron church . . . holds, Sunday after Sunday, the most active and devoted body of Christians of any church in the world with which I am acquainted; and yet all its members are black Zulus. . . . When the service is over, that church of two hundred and fifty members, with some visitors, perhaps, from other churches, divides itself up into forty-eight evangelistic bands, and goes out to proclaim the gospel of Christ in different parts of the city of Durban. Every member of the church who is of sound body and mind belongs to one of these groups. . . . Sunday after Sunday, summer and winter, in wet and dry, these bands have gone out for more than a dozen years without a break.

And so on. These are your lazybones! It should be borne in mind that, in Natal, the Zulus who have been under missionary influence are in especially bad odor for laziness, because they are not so easily browbeaten into working as the unmitigated heathen. This is understood to be one reason why the government, which as a Christian and English government can hardly forbid English missionaries from preaching, has seen fit to forbid the natives to have either churches or schools under their own management; there must be quarterly inspection by a white man or white society who are willing to be responsible, or else the buildings must be burned and the institutions broken up. This law is enforced against churches whose pastors have been trained in a theological seminary, and schools whose teachers have been trained in a boarding-school,—churches and schools that the native Christians themselves have gathered in entire harmony with the white missionaries and with their highest approval,—if the missionaries are too far distant, across a wild country, to give regular quarterly visits of inspection.

In other words, the Zulus are willing to be strenuous for war, strenuous for religion, strenuous for education, but they have not yet learned the habit of being strenuous for money; and because they cannot pass this test, which appears to be the supreme test of all in our civilization, this tax is levied in order to compel them to put their time on money instead of reserving it for their other interests, be these other interests preaching or idling. This may doubtless be the best way to make all the races of the world just like ourselves. I hope we admire ourselves properly, when we take such pains to keep anybody else from living otherwise than in imitation of us.

STEVEN T. BYINGTON.

The Basis of Rights.

I wish to assure Mr. Walker that the omission of a part of the quotation from "Communism and Conscience" was not intentional. At any rate, it should have been obvious that my criticism was based, not upon the misquotation, but upon the paragraph as it is now printed.

The point which Mr. Walker raises in his third paragraph is one upon which much might be said; but, in view of the evidence which he adduces, I will candidly admit that some sensible people are not so sensible as my previous statement gave them credit for being. On the other hand, I did not in my former article have in mind those "higher attributes" which a discussion of theology naturally brings out, but I agree with Mr. Walker that the generalization correctly includes them.

Accepting Mr. Walker's substitution of the word "inherited" for "natural," I still maintain that rights are not a heritage in the sense that one's body and mentality are. The body and mentality of a human being are a part of him—they are he; he has them the instant he is born, and they are inseparable from him. Rights, on the other hand, he has none, except those his parents or guardians choose to give him, until he has acquired sufficient power to take them or enter into an agreement with other human beings by which certain rights are accorded to him. He has not, when he is born, the right to make such contract, because he has not the power to make it.

It is true that the contract is not the creator of rights, in the sense that two men by contracting might create rights which they do not possess; but they might assure each other by contract that they would mutually refrain from molestation, each thus obtaining a *right* to freedom from invasion by the other which depends upon his according the same right to the other. Thus it is seen that the contract is merely a modification of the right of might,—a corollary, as it were, of the law of might; and it follows from this that the right to contract is merely the power to contract, and the former cannot, therefore, possibly antedate the latter.

"Six men contracting to assault and rob" me do create the right to do so, if none of them had the power to do it alone. At the same time, this is a misconception of my argument, inasmuch as my obvious implication was that rights secured by contract were those which an individual might secure for himself by contracting, with individuals or combinations of individuals stronger than he, for their concession. Whether he or his group has the right to invade other individuals or groups depends simply upon their power.

All this, of course, is merely for the purpose of getting down to fundamentals—to the basis of all rights, which is might. Once having recognized this as the starting point,—a point which primitive man and even the lower animals see clearly,—the necessity for "inherited" rights disappears and the construction of the whole fabric of ethics is simple. With the first glimmer of intelligence, primitive man sees that it does not pay to wage continual war with every one of his fellows; he soon reaches an understanding with his own tribe by which certain rights are conceded to all, in return for general

immunity from invasion by each individual. The right to invade a neighboring tribe, however, is still only the right of might, until increasing wisdom points out the advisability of combining with that tribe, even if principally for defence against still more remote invaders. And so, step by step, evolution goes on until—as we hope—equal freedom will come to be recognized as the guiding principle, and then, indeed, will a contract that contravenes this principle be ethically invalid.

Having thus gone back to first principles, no difficulty is presented by any of the illustrations which Mr. Walker cites. In the first place, I deny flatly that the child inherits the right to its body and brain. It has no right to either until it is able to maintain it. The thing that incontestably disposes, in my view, of the theory that there are natural rights is the reduction of that theory to its logical conclusion, which is that, if there are natural rights (which belong to the individual through the simple fact of his existence), the recognition of these rights must be natural, inevitable, compelled by the simple fact of their existence. Do we find this to be true? Far from it. No one dreams of natural rights until some philosopher proclaims them. How does the same test apply to the theory of potential rights? Admirably. Their recognition is practically unanimous, from the spider that eats her mate to Japan that conquers Russia. The sooner this fact is adopted as the basis of ethics, the sooner will it become generally apparent that expediency prompts the acceptance of the principle of equal liberty.

I must call Mr. Walker's attention to the fact that he places an unwarranted construction upon my statements; for instance, when he says:

I affirm the "natural right" of the baby to its foot. Does C. L. S. take issue? If so, to whom does he assign the "contractual right" to destroy it?

Now it is certainly obvious that a "contractual right" to destroy a baby's foot is an anomalous thing, because the baby has no power to contract. If I am the possessor of the baby, I may delegate the power to destroy the baby's foot to whomsoever I choose. The right, in this case, is the primitive one of might—there is no occasion for a contract for its acquisition. (Mr. Walker's next proposition is simply the same thing stated in a different way. I take issue in the same manner.)

"The interests of those who do not enter into the contract" are simply ignored. Like the people who are not members of a private fire or burglar protective agency, they derive no benefits from the combination. Since they do not guarantee the coöperating group against invasion by them, they in turn receive no guaranty of protection against depredations by the contracting group, the abstention or non-abstention on the part of the latter from despoiling the former depending wholly upon the estimated expediency or in expediency of the enterprise. If Mr. Walker were not inclined to take things too literally, I should not feel it necessary to point out that the foregoing remark applies to a more or less primitive stage of social development, and that, if we are to assume—for argument's sake—that we are now living under the law of equal freedom, I should certainly consider myself invaded if I were despoiled by any one, since the acceptance

of the principle of equal freedom by the community in which I live implies also that we not only guarantee to respect it as between ourselves, but to defend each other against its infringement by those who have not accepted it—provided always, of course, that we are able so to do.

I must enter a positive, unqualified protest against the construction which Mr. Walker insists upon putting upon the word contract. In almost every instance he uses the word as if it in no manner concerned the party most interested. It is certainly a misconception to assume that I meant that two persons contracting together to despoil a third create thereby the right to do it (except in the sense that their combination increases their power). The obvious and rational construction is that two or more persons may contract to let each other alone and to protect each other against others who attempt to invade. It seems strange that Mr. Walker should place any other construction upon my words.

Yes, frankly, my "contract is based on physical strength and intellectual cunning only." It has relation to equity, however, in just so far as the contractors' conception of equity goes.

Mr. Walker's illustration of the Apache and the white settler's baby is all right, except that he fails to see that, since there was no contract between the Indian and the white man (they being virtually at war with each other), the former merely exercised the right of might—which later was transferred to the white man, thanks to the intervention of the latter's copartner, who in this case was the United States government.

I understood perfectly that Mr. Walker identified injury with invasion "only when there was an intention to injure the non-invading,"—that, of course, was apparent. And still my one answer holds good; Mr. Walker has not overthrown it, his illustrations being absolutely worthless for that purpose. In the first instance, he neglects to take cognizance of the fact that his friend's alleged inaction is really an action, since he was responsible for bringing the team to its place on the top of a steep hill—"he has driven it there," says Mr. Walker. His driving it there constitutes an action which does not cease until he has removed it safely from the public highway, and his responsibility for the results of the runaway is therefore clear. Again, a fireman is virtually under contract to assist in putting out fires wherever and whenever he is called upon to do so. Therefore his failure to respond when the fire is "destroying the property and endangering the life of one he does not like" is clearly a breach of contract, for which he may justly be held responsible. The third instance does involve a more delicate distinction, and, while there may be room for a difference of opinion, I think it must be held that, in such a case, every man is obligated by his contract of mutual defence to assist, to the extent of his ability, in preventing invasive acts against members of his group or association. It is quite clear that none of these illustrations is analogous to the proposition which called forth my former criticism, since in all of them the person who refuses to act is under tacit or actual contract to act, which makes all the difference in the world. The man whose action consisted in buying goods of a certain dealer, and who now refuses so to act, violates, by such refusal, no obligation, either ex-

press or implied. Naturally my contention that a mere refusal to act could not constitute an invasion implied that there existed no obligation to act,—in other words, that there was perfect freedom to refrain from acting. Let Mr. Walker meet the issue squarely!

On account of the length of this reply, I have refrained from considering some of the minor points in Mr. Walker's article, such as his distinction between rights and the enjoyment of them, etc.; but I think these issues are in general subsidiary to the points I have discussed, and therefore practically covered by my remarks.

C. L. S.

Freeland and Its Protagonists.

In reply to both Mr. Horr and Mr. Wastall, it is necessary to point out that I alone am responsible for the remarks concerning "Freeland" which appeared in No. 388 of Liberty. Whatever of "trouble" there may be is wholly mine. I had no intention of conveying the impression that the "scope and purpose" of "Freeland" were narrow and unpretentious. On account of its voluminous proportions and of my lack of time, I may not have given the book so thorough a reading as I should have done had Hertzka offered "a new solution of the land question, a new theory of value, a view of economic practice," etc., shorn of his abortive attempt at fiction. It is almost too much to ask of one to burrow into so much chaff to find the grain that may be therein.

I have not deliberately shirked a difficulty. If Mr. Horr wishes to know the bare, bald facts in the case, I can tell him that I have not found in "Freeland" what I consider "a new solution of the land question." What Hertzka offers in this matter is a crude proposition of occupancy and use with a sort of single-taxiform appendix, with all of which I, as well as the readers of Liberty, have long been familiar. The "new theory of value" I have not found at all. As for the "view of economic practice almost diametrically opposed to that for which Liberty stands," I still see nothing more than the hybrid to which I referred in No. 388; and so to classify anti-rationalism has, so far as I can see, nothing whatever to do with "the history of the development of political terminology"; neither do I consider it necessary to occupy Liberty's space with a theory the separate parts of which have been so thoroughly met in this paper in the past. I have no right, of course, to question the originality of Hertzka's "theory of machine production," as well as his reaching, independently of other economists, a more or less rational conception of economics; but, while granting him all the credit for this which he deserves, it is none the less true that all he gives to the world in "Freeland" was known before the world knew him. The idea that machinery, in order to make its use profitable, must save a difference between its own cost (including wear and tear and cost of operation) and the cost of producing the same article without the use of machinery is of course obviously true; that, were labor to receive its full product (thus increasing its capacity for consumption), machines saving a smaller percentage of labor than when the cost of labor was less could be profitably used; and that, at the same time, the demand for the product would be increased, are

facts of which I was cognizant long before I ever heard of Hertzka and before the date of the first appearance of "Freeland"; and I cannot, therefore, accept Mr. Horr's contention that Hertzka's presentation of the theory is "uniquely" original.

It may not be conceivable to Mr. Horr that I can wish his Freeland colony success; but, as I have no ill will toward the colonists, and am curious to know what results success would produce, I do not feel that I am inconsistent in doubting, at the same time, the value of a successful reproduction of Hertzka's plan when I am convinced that such success can come only through the angelification of the colonists; for I have never had any faith in reforms which depended for their accomplishment upon the regeneration of human nature.

Mr. Horr's assertion that "the anticrats are almost alone in their willingness to abide by the law of equal freedom and its corollaries" is merely evidence of a congenital characteristic which none of us who know him expects him ever to outgrow; and, when he reiterates that remark, Anarchists are simply amused.

It may be true that, socially considered, Hertzka's individualism, as Mr. Wastall says, is beyond question; but my reading of his book has not given me the idea that his scheme is very near the Anarchist ideal. It is quite apparent that he has tried to build "a bridge to span the gulf" which separates Anarchism, Communism, and Socialism; but the result is just what I characterized it in my previous article, except, perhaps, that the hybrid really has some Anarchistic tendencies. A bridge, however, which rests upon such piers as majority rule and compulsory taxation is not one upon which Anarchists will trust themselves, even to reach more than Hertzka promises.

If either Mr. Horr or Mr. Wastall feels that I have misinterpreted any of the statements made in "Freeland," I invite him to point out the divergence; for, with such a vague and disjointed presentation of economic theories as the book offers, it requires some enthusiastic disciple of Hertzka to expound the doctrines the author attempts to promulgate. C. L. S.

Judge Morrow, of San Francisco, has granted an injunction against a sympathetic boycott, holding that it is a "criminal conspiracy" to injure an innocent third party by what he terms collective "action" of this sort. Just what has been enjoined is not clear from newspaper reports, but it is well to go to the bottom of the case and see what, if anything, *can* be enjoined. The labor organizations of San Francisco warned all persons to abstain from buying of a firm that handled so-called "unfair" goods. Assuming that the labor organizations were not contemplating any invasive acts toward those who did not heed the warning,—that is, that the only penalty for ignoring the warning would be the loss of the patronage of the members of the organization,—against what can the injunction be effectively directed? The only possible proof of the violation of the injunction would be for some person to admit that he withheld his patronage from the boycotted firm in obedience to the warning issued by the organization. Would

that admission be forthcoming? If the injunction is to apply to the organization that issued the boycotting order, it would be a simple matter for the word to be passed around without the formality of an official order or warning, and thus the law would be left to hold the bag. Don Quixote's campaign against the windmills was a brilliant enterprise compared with this attempt of the courts to force people to buy goods where they prefer not to buy them.

Indiana has adopted a "strong" anti-cigarette act. Under it not only dealers, but smokers, have been arrested and fined for having even the "makings" of cigarettes in their possession. The fanatics and cranks, not the plutocrats, procured this piece of fool legislation. Now watch the courts, those rigid champions of individual liberty. Will they sustain the law as an exercise of the police power or set it aside as a gratuitous violation of personal rights? On reflection, the tobacco trust is fighting the law, and tenderness for this interest may prompt a decision favorable to liberty. There's hope for the Indiana smokers.

"C. L. S." as Reviewer and Critic.

It would seem that "C. L. S." read "Communism and Conscience" very hastily. This is shown, first, by his opening quotation, which is a bad misquotation. I reproduce it here, putting in brackets the words he omitted:

The assumption that there are no natural rights, that there are only social rights, at most, grows out of strange forgetfulness of the fact that all we are, in body, in emotions, in mind, in morals, in social life, is natural. If we have social rights, they are [natural rights, for society is natural, is a part of nature, as it is] composed of individuals who are natural, who are parts of nature.

A second evidence of hasty reading is found in these words of C. L. S.:

The whole contention of his [mine], therefore, that nothing that exists is unnatural is a mere waste of words; it is a truism that no sensible person thinks of disputing.

It hardly will be contended by even C. L. S. that there are no "sensible" persons outside the ranks of free-thinking evolutionists, and yet a large part of the orthodox world of to-day would dispute the truth of the "truism." So distinguished a man as Dr. McCosh, while forced reluctantly to admit that the case for the evolution of man's body seemed to be established, could not concede that his intellectual and ethical nature had had a like development. But this attitude of orthodoxy, past and present, which should be known to all who make a study of large questions, is in a lesser degree the attitude of some who long ago departed from the old paths. On pages six and seven of "Communism and Conscience" I quoted from Spencer in criticism of some utterances of Huxley on this point, contained in his "Evolution and Ethics." Did C. L. S. wholly miss these and other significant words of Spencer?

The position that he [Huxley] takes, that we have to struggle against or correct the cosmic process, involves the assumption that there exists something in us which is not a product of the cosmic process, and is practically a going back to the old theological notions which put man and nature in antithesis. Any rational, comprehensive view of evolution involves that, in the course of social evolution, the human mind is disciplined into that form which itself puts a check upon that part of the cosmic process which consists in the unqualified struggle for existence.

When even Huxley seems to lean toward the orthodox view of nature as something apart from man's higher attributes, surely I may be pardoned for thinking that the maintenance of the position so earnestly defended by Spencer is not a mere "waste of words," that the statement of the fact of unity is not a "truism."

As to the main contention of the deniers of "natural" rights—inherited rights, if that designation will make clearer the thought involved—that there are no such rights, that all so-called rights are ob-

tained by conquest or contract by the persons who enjoy them, there is this to be said: Speaking of man in the social state, it is affirmed that his natural rights constitute a heritage from the past of his culture-step, just as his body constitutes a heritage, just as his mentality is a heritage, just as his emotions constitute a heritage. In each instance, a heritage slightly modifiable in each new generation, precisely as the heritage of body or mind or emotions or rights as it stands at this moment was slightly modified in each successive past generation. The body of rights thus received includes the right to contract for the maintenance of these inherited rights and for their extension, both in number and direction. The contract is *this* side of the rights, not *that* side of them. The right to contract antedates the expression by any number of men in this generation of their recognition of their own and others' rights of any particular kind. What shall be contracted for at any time by any group will depend upon the richness or poverty of the inheritance of that group's race-family, modified in some measure by its contact with or its knowledge of other race-families, and by its physical environment. In other words, the contract is merely a method of defending rights, or of preventing their enjoyment, as the case may be; it is not their creator. A contract does not cancel equities, without the consent of all involved; it does not destroy or suspend rights without the consent of the victim, and then only his. Six men contracting to assault and rob C. L. S. do not create a right to do this thing; his right to a whole skin and unfilched purse is anterior to and above their contract to maim and despoil him. A "contractual right" is only a section of the whole body of natural rights. It is the child, not the parent, so to speak. A contract that contravenes the principle of equal liberty is ethically invalid, just as a contract that traverses the equities recognized in statute law is legally invalid.

The child inherits the right to the body and brain and individuality it has received from its race-family. This is its natural, its inherited right. It is no answer to say, as C. L. S. does, that "we are deprived every day of some of those rights which Mr. Walker holds to be natural." We are not deprived of the rights; we are only denied the enjoyment of them for the time being. If the child's foot is amputated, does that prove the foot was not natural? If a lawyer cheats C. L. S. out of an inheritance of one hundred dollars, does that prove that my critic had not a legal right to the money? If he contracts with a bookseller for a certain work and the censor steps in and confiscates the book, does that prove he and the dealer made no contract or had no right to make one?

I affirm the "natural right" of the baby to its foot. Does C. L. S. take issue? If so, to whom does he assign the "contractual right" to destroy it? I affirm the natural right of the baby to opportunity to grow, physically and mentally; to have liberty of thought, expression, motion. Does C. L. S. take issue? If so, to whom does he ascribe the "contractual right" to dwarf or cripple its body, to compress its brain, to impose perpetual silence upon it, to hold it in slavery?

My critic denies the existence of natural rights, in the sense of inherited rights. In lieu thereof he puts rights acquired by contract. But what of the interests of those who do not enter into the contract? Are those on the inside under any obligation to regard the interests of those on the outside? If they are under any such obligation, if it be not that of fear, what is it? If they are *not* under any such obligation, who is to be censured by those who contract and who take this attitude, if they are themselves robbed, maltreated, enslaved? If C. L. S., who holds, as he thinks, all his rights by contract, is despoiled by another person, not bound to him by contract, or by another aggregation, assuredly he will accept his loss in a calm and philosophical spirit. Not having any natural, inherited, rights, he can not be invaded by one who has not contracted to respect his interests. He may have been "injured"; he has not been "wronged," and so he will be absent entirely from his discussions of the incident; he will not talk of "robbers," "thieves," "slavemongers," "tyrants," or "murderers." All these and similar terms are in the vocabulary of ethics, and imply rights and their trampling, wrong and the commission of wrongs.

What C. L. S. says concerning my alleged reasoning in a circle has been answered already, when I pointed out that the amputation of the baby's foot by natural agencies did not dispose of the naturalness of the foot. The utilization of natural rights is interfered with by persons who are natural, but a failure to use, from whatever cause, does not disprove the existence of a right or function. C. L. S. is blessed with eyesight; it is natural; his right to it is indisputable, and he only may destroy it without invasion. No others rightfully may contract to remove his eyes without his assent. If they do remove them, they both injure and wrong him, and the inalienability (by others) of his right to sight establishes his claim against them for damages for the invasion of his person and destruction of the organs by means of which he enjoyed his right. The offense of King George and his ministry was not the destruction of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,—for the right of the non-intruding could not, can not, be destroyed,—but his and its denial of the opportunity to enjoy that right.

Rights do not "inhere in us by virtue of the mere fact that we have been born," we are again told. Then your contract is based on physical force and intellectual cunning only; it has no relation to equity. The white settler's baby, being born without rights, has none when the Apache finds it and tortures it to death. That's all right, so far as the baby is concerned; it should have known better than to be born so deficient. But what about the Apache? He, too, according to your postulate, was born without rights, including the right to kill the white child. He had no contract with the settler and his wife (the baby's absolute owners, according to the very ancient morals of our very modern reformers), and so did not receive from them a license to murder their infant. It seems to me that our Apache is "up in the air," as regards any sort of authorization for his act, and he appears to have company in his elevation.

C. L. S. is positive that I err egregiously in identifying invasion with injury. Of course I have identified them only when there was an *intention* to injure the non-invading. Necessarily, injuries result often from accident or in the ordinary non-aggressive vocations and avocations of life. I made it plain that I did not refer to injuries so caused. My critic seems to have, always, but one answer—"that is, if there be merely abstention from acting, certain it is that there has been no invasion." All the difference lies between "action" and "inaction," acting and "refusal to act." This is sometimes true, but in a reversed sense from that intended by C. L. S. As a matter of fact, there are many offences which are offences because the guilty person has *not* acted. If my friend has driven a team attached to a loaded vehicle to the top of a steep hill and has paused to rest while his enemy's children are at play at the foot of the hill in front of him, and if his team starts to run while he is near enough to seize the lines and stop them—what will happen if it is proved he made no effort to do so and the horses run away and drag the wagon over the children and kill or injure one or more of them? What about a charge of criminal negligence or worse? Would not a plea that he had *not* acted be the worst defence he could make? Suppose he is a fireman and refuses to help put out the fire that is destroying the property and endangering the life of one he does not like? His refusal is "merely abstention from acting," you know! Or, again, he has knowledge of the intended murder of a man at a certain time and place, but neither warns the victim-to-be or informs the authorities. No doubt he sees what some others see, the "essential difference" between "an act of his" and a mere "refusal to act," a difference which is hidden from me in a multitude of instances, except, possibly, as slightly, sometimes, affecting the degree of the wrong done, but not its kind.

My comments on the particular observations of C. L. S. on my position regarding the boycott, must be reserved for incorporation in the article dealing with the lengthy examination by Mr. Byington, in the December issue of Liberty. The pressure of work I could not put aside has so far prevented the writing of the answer that should have appeared months ago.

EDWIN C. WALKER.

A Protest from an Anticrat.

To the Editor of Liberty:

C. L. S. in reviewing Hertzka's "Freeland" makes a comparison between Hertzka's work and Bellamy's that is certainly flattering to the author of "Looking Backward" and "Equality." But this is your trouble and not mine. I do object to the impression the reviewer conveys of the scope and purpose of Hertzka's work by fragmentary quotations that represent neither the essence of the theory or the general trend of the author's ethics and sociology.

I am rather surprised that C. L. S. in dealing with the essentials of "Freeland" should have nothing more to say than "that the book attempts to solve serious problems in sociology and especially in economics." It smacks too much of the polite platitudes that emanate from professional sources, when giving a friendly boost to some scribbling aspirant for academic honors. This is not the way Liberty (and she is surely responsible for C. L. S.'s tactics in this matter) has handled opposing views in the past when held by earnest men. I look back with pleasure at the strenuous warfare carried on by Liberty against such stalwarts as George, Bilgram, Byington, Walker, Donisthorpe, Shaw, Levy, Auberon Herbert, and a host of others; but I do not remember a single case where Liberty shirked a difficulty to the extent of refusing to consider the essentials at issue. "Freeland" offers a new solution of the land question, a new theory of value, a view of economic practice almost diametrically opposed to that for which Liberty stands, and a theory of machine production and its relation to the problems of industrial panics—which, if true, reverse the whole complex of theories as to the economic tendencies of the age. What is more, the theory is entirely, uniquely original, has never been put to the test of an exhaustive criticism, and deserves very much more than contemptuous silence.

Or are these propositions and the skill with which Hertzka handles them beneath criticism? I ask the question advisedly, for, then, why mention the work at all? If it is good enough to rail at, it ought to be good enough to be met. Are the theories of "Freeland" sound or unsound? If sound, why this suspicious silence? If unsound, why not spot the error as Liberty has been in the habit of doing in the past? Or has Liberty lost her grip and is she reduced to the necessity of meeting new problems with slurs and sneers? I should regret to see Liberty sink to such a level; it is one of the few papers that have a reputation to maintain. The use of a hard name is not an argument and to classify what Hertzka stands for among hybrids is a plain disregard of the history of the development of political terminology. C. L. S. should put his working clothes on when "Freeland" is assigned him for a text.

Why C. L. S. should wish Freelanders "every measure of success . . . while doubting the plan and doubting the value of it even if it should duplicate the experiences of the fictitious African experiment" is not in line with any code of consistency, and I am sure that Liberty has never been in the habit of wishing success to political theories that were not Anarchistic. It seems to me that this is an unconscious tribute, wrung from an unwilling witness, to the truth for which "Freeland" stands in economics and methods as against what Liberty stands for. Am I right? If not, why not?

Now as to that much maligned and long suffering term "anticratism." It is not of my coining and so I am not responsible for its cacophony; its use is as old as of the word Anarchism and, permit me to say, that tastes may well differ as to which is more "cacophonous." In any event, I prefer to be in bad taste to being in a bad state; it is an old habit of mine and I am too old to grow out of it. I may be mistaken; but, until a larger wisdom overtakes me, I am compelled to hold that the anticrats are almost alone in their willingness to abide by the law of equal freedom and its corollaries. This alone would justify the use of the term.

ALEX. HERR,

Secretary of Freeland Colony.

Bow, Wash., May 11, 1905.

I will stop at no point so long as clear reasoning will carry me further.—Huxley.

Another Unsatisfied Freeland.

To the Editor of Liberty:

In your critique of "Freeland" and comment on Mr. Alexander Herr's effort to establish a colony run on its principles at Bow, Washington, you surely overlook the intrinsic value of the economic discovery Dr. Hertzka unquestionably made. No less a critic than Darwin's collaborator, Alfred Russell Wallace, gave him due credit for this.

Liberty's attitude towards any movement that diverges from the plumb-line of Anarchism is comprehensible enough; but it is at least open to doubt whether truth, irrespective of ideals or theories, is best served in this way. For instance, you would dispose of Hertzka by classing him with Bellamy, and infer that the tangible result of each author's work will be similar. In this your discernment is certainly at fault. Bellamy took hold of the stick by the wrong end. He made use of economics for purposes of fiction and probably achieved all the success he really deserved. Hertzka, on the contrary, used fiction merely to serve economics, and his romance was confessedly weak. He grasped the stick firmly by its right end, the end that Proudhon and Warren had handled before him; and he used it, in my opinion, effectively on the back both of Bellamy himself and of all governmentalists whatsoever.

There is already a consensus of opinion amongst the world's best thinkers as to the correctness of Anarchist ideals. The question that still awaits an answer is rather how best to bring them about, and I maintain that Theodor Hertzka has immensely helped in this direction. His individualism is beyond question, and he has built a bridge to span the gulf between it and the various phases of Socialism that oppose the present State. He is a reconciler of factionists and the party aloofness which has long been the real bane of social reformers; and I believe that, if either Proudhon, or Warren, or Jefferson were now amongst us, the real merit of his scheme would have not thus long awaited recognition and adoption.

Warren himself, it should be remembered, was a colony enthusiast, and as such believed, no doubt, that the future would belong to those who worked for and prepared it. We, on the other hand, are degenerating into a set of "argumentarians" and disputants.

Now, the Freeland plan is nothing if not fundamentally economic. Its social side is sufficiently elastic to suit all the needs of divergent views, growth, and development. It is therefore clear that, to combat it successfully, one must show it to be economically unsound. It is noteworthy, however, that, as far as my experience goes,—and I was associated with the movement twelve years back, as a member of the committee of the British Freeland Association,—no critic has yet attempted this feat. On the contrary, those who have closely investigated it agree that its vulnerable parts are at least not vital, and it has never therefore been vitally hurt.

As I see it, it is far and away the best solution yet found of effective combination against governmentalism and, of course, capitalism. You may doubt this, and, as you say, doubt its plan; but, if you persist in doubting the value of the *success* of such a plan, then I must consider your blindness of the kind of those long and strong-legged bipeds who won't see!

Would it not rekindle hope in every reformer's breast, and inspire him or her to trust more to deeds than words? Would it not afford all of us—who are sick of the irrational and sordid character of our blighted and circumscribed lives—an opportunity to vastly ameliorate our conditions here and now, and hand on a foretaste of freedom to generations yet to come? Surely such an achievement would be worth striving for, counterbalanced in some measure though it might be by the risk of government interference and assimilation—which, I am free to confess, is great under the American flag.

But, if Freeland once takes root to the extent of inviting government hatred, and consequently fear, its battle will have been already fought and won, and assimilation by the State can only hurt its prosperity for the time. The Freelanders' secret of success will by then be out and published to the world to such extent that ultimately it may itself be transformed by it.

Certainly the project would have excited more confidence had its original architect undertaken himself the task that now falls to his disciples. They must be saturated through and through with his main ideas to avoid another risk of failure; but it is evidently time that some of us reformers were aroused out of the state of indolence and timidity into which we seem to have fallen, and I, for one, welcome such a promise as this of activity along the right lines.

ARTHUR WASTALL.
East London, Cape Colony, June 4, 1905.

No Intractable Jurors Wanted.

To the Editor of Liberty:

On June 12th, 1905, I was called for jury service before Judge Holland in the United States court of this city. I informed the judge, publicly, that I was an absolutely free trader, and that I could not, therefore, find a verdict for the government against any persons charged with violation of tariff laws or excise laws; that I considered such laws immoral, and reserved to myself the right to judge of the morality or immorality of any law under which I might be asked to serve. The judge informed me that I was not thereby disqualified from acting under other than tariff and excise laws, but that in such cases I would probably be excused from service. I attended court for five days; I was called into the jury box twice, but, with several others, on each occasion, was "excused from serving." I cannot know whether the challenges emanated from the prosecution or the defence, no reasons having been given in any case.

SAMUEL MILLIKEN.

Philadelphia, Pa., June 23, 1905.

Some New Books.

Mrs. Mabel MacCoy Irwin recently published a small but beautiful volume on "Whitman, the Poet-Liberator of Woman," in which the work of Whitman is treated and applied in a new and original way, and which to some modern Whitmanites may seem sacrilegious; but the poet himself would not exclude her, were he here to read what she has written, so she may rest secure in the knowledge of having made a contribution of lasting value to Whitmaniana. The book is bound in "good gray" cloth, with a special leaves-of-grass cover design, and may be had from the publisher of Liberty for one dollar (postage, six cents extra).

Among other books which Liberty has received, but for the review of which no opportunity has yet been found, are:

"Edward Carpenter: Poet and Prophet," by Ernest Crosby, and published by Arthur C. Fifield, 44 Fleet Street, London, E. C. Price, paper, sixpence, net.

"Broad-Cast," a volume of poems by Ernest Crosby, also published by Arthur C. Fifield, at 44 Fleet Street, London, E. C. Price, cloth (128 pages), 1s. 9d., net. (In this country, 75 cents.)

"Tolstoi as a Schoolmaster," another volume by Ernest Crosby, comes from the Hammersmark Publishing Co., Chicago. Cloth, 94 pages.

"Paris and the Social Revolution," by Alvan Sanborn, with drawings by Vaughan Trowbridge, has just been published by Small, Maynard & Co., Boston. It is a large and beautiful quarto volume of over 400 pages, and is an exhaustive study of the subject.

"La Grande Grève" (The General Strike), by Charles Malato, is a "social novel" published by the Librairie des Publications Populaires, 16 Rue des Fossés-Saint-Jacques, Paris, France. Paper, 500 pages, 3 fr. 50.

"Iconoclasts, a Book of Dramatists," by James Huneker, has recently come from the press of Charles Scribner's Sons. It is a collection of critical essays on those modern dramatists (including Ibsen, Shaw, and Maeterlinck) who have something to tell the world, the greater part of the essays, so it is stated, having first appeared in the columns of the New York "Sun," when the author was dramatic editor of that journal. Bound in cloth, 430 pages, \$1.50.

The "Freethinker's Catechism," by Edgar Monteil, translated from the French by Frederic Mitchell, has just been issued by the Truth Seeker Company (62 Vesey Street, New York), price 35 cents. The same company has also just published new editions of "Old Testament Stories Comically Illustrated" and

"New Testament Stories Comically Illustrated," illustrations by Watson Heston. In boards, each \$1.00; in cloth, \$1.50. Both in one volume, boards, \$2.00; cloth, \$2.50.

The Ariel Press, Westwood, Mass., has brought out a book by J. Wm. Lloyd, entitled "The Dwellers in Vale Sunrise," being a sequel to the same author's "Natural Man." Cloth, 195 pages, \$1.00.

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
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
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